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ABSTRACT	Surveillance	data	serving	for	epidemic	alert	systems	are	typically	fully	aggregated	in	space.	However,	epidemics	may	be	spatially	heterogeneous,	undergoing	distinct	dynamics	in	distinct	regions	of	the	surveillance	area.	We	unveil	this	in	retrospective	analyses	by	classifying	incidence	time	series.	We	use	Pearson	correlation	to	quantify	the	similarity	between	local	time	series	and	then	classify	them	using	modularity	maximization.	The	surveillance	area	is	thus	divided	into	regions	with	different	incidence	patterns.	We	analyzed	31	years	of	data	on	influenza-like-illness	from	the	French	system	Sentinelles	and	found	spatial	heterogeneity	in	19/31	influenza	seasons.	However,	distinct	epidemic	regions	could	be	identified	only	4-5	weeks	after	the	nationwide	alert.	The	impact	of	spatial	heterogeneity	on	influenza	epidemiology	was	complex.	First,	when	the	nationwide	alert	was	triggered,	32-41%	of	the	administrative	regions	were	experiencing	an	epidemic,	while	the	others	were	not.	Second,	the	nationwide	alert	was	timely	for	the	whole	surveillance	area,	but,	subsequently,	regions	experienced	distinct	epidemic	dynamics.	Third,	the	epidemic	dynamics	were	homogeneous	in	space.	Spatial	heterogeneity	analyses	can	provide	the	timing	of	the	epidemic	peak	and	finish,	in	various	regions,	to	tailor	disease	monitoring	and	control.		
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Syndromic	surveillance	systems	(1-6)	are	operational	in	many	countries	(7-18).	Such	systems	routinely	gather	data	on	the	number	of	clinical	cases	of	infectious	diseases	over	large	surveillance	areas.		After	curation	and	consolidation,	data	can	be	summarized	as	time	series	of	disease	incidence.		Nationwide	epidemic	alert	systems	(19-23)	are	typically	based	on	aggregating	data	over	the	whole	surveillance	area	(i.e.,	highest	level	of	spatial	aggregation),	to	inform	top-down	strategies	of	public	health.	However,	epidemics	may	be	highly	heterogeneous	in	space.	Therefore,	alerts	from	global	systems	may	not	concur	with	local	epidemic	dynamics;	the	national	public	health	message	may	arrive	either	too	late	or	too	early	for	the	local	health	authorities.			In	this	work,	we	develop	new	analyses	of	surveillance	data	to	assess	spatial	heterogeneity	of	epidemics,	using	elements	of	metapopulation	theory	(24).		In	this	context,	the	problem	of	disentangling	the	dynamics	occurring	in	a	large	surveillance	area	is	known	as	the	mega-patch	problem	(25).		Specifically,	our	problem	is	to	classify	large-scale,	spatiotemporal	surveillance	data	and	figure	out	weakly	interacting	epidemics	of	the	same	infectious	disease	in	subpopulations	inhabiting	different	demographic	areas.	Hence,	we	aim	to	assess	epidemic	heterogeneity	in	the	surveillance	area	and	aggregate	the	data	by	subpopulation,	to	analyze	the	performance	of	global	epidemic	alert	systems.			We	apply	our	methods	to	influenza-like	illness	(ILI)	data	collected	in	the	metropolitan	France	by	the	Sentinelles	surveillance	system	(26,	27),	a	network	of	voluntary,	unpaid,	general	practitioners	who	report	weekly	numbers	of	ILI	diagnostics	together	with	age,	sex,	vaccination	status	and	clinical	characteristics	
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of	patients.	Influenza-like	illness	was	defined	as	a	sudden	onset	of	fever	over	39	degrees	Celsius	with	myalgia	and	respiratory	symptoms	(cough,	sore	throat)	(28).			Time	series	for	the	number	of	ILI	cases	per	100	000	individuals	per	week	(i.e.,	ILI	incidence),	from	1984	to	present	day,	are	available	at	four	different	levels	of	spatial	resolution:	96	departments	(NUTS3),	22	administrative	regions	(NUTS2),	13	administrative	regions	(NUTS1)	and	the	national	level.	The	variance	of	incidence	is	estimated	assuming	that	the	number	of	reported	cases	obeys	the	Poisson	statistics.	Hence,	95%	confidence	intervals	(CI)	are	calculated	for	all	weekly	incidence	estimates,	using	a	normal	approximation	(29).	Furthermore,	a	weekly	threshold	for	the	national	alert	of	influenza	epidemic	is	estimated	from	the	ILI	incidence	time	series	(18).	The	nationwide	alert	for	influenza	epidemic	is	triggered	when	ILI	incidence	exceeds	this	threshold	for	two	consecutive	weeks	(18).	Demographic	data	matching	the	time	period	of	the	Sentinelles	data	are	available	from	the	Institut	National	de	la	Statistique	et	des	Etudes	Economiques	(30).			
METHODS	We	assume	that	the	surveillance	area	is	divided	into	N	smaller	units	for	simultaneous	data	collection,	called	catchment	areas.	In	each	catchment	area,	data	is	collected	independently	and	may	be	further	used	to	reconstruct	a	time	series	of	incidence,	to	be	assigned	to	the	catchment	area.		
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Epidemics	occur	in	spatially	heterogeneous	demographic	environments.	Hence,	the	epidemic	dynamics	at	the	national	scale	may	originate	from	a	sum	of	several,	say	C,	nearly	independent	epidemics,	each	of	them	established	into	a	distinct	community,	included	in	the	surveillance	area.	A	community	epidemic	may	be	localized	in	a	region	spanning	several	catchment	areas,	called	epidemic	region.	See	Fig.	1,	where	catchment	areas	i	and	j	are	included	in	epidemic	region	a,	while	catchment	area	k	is	included	in	epidemic	region	b.	Studying	interdependence	between	incidence	time	series,	constructed	for	each	catchment	area,	may	suggest	how	to	group/classify	these	space	units	and	reconstruct	the	epidemic	regions	(Fig.	1).				Over	a	short	time	interval,	the	total	number	of	clinical	cases	reported	in	a	catchment	area,	comprised	into	an	epidemic	region,	has	two	contributions.	It	contains	(1)	a	fraction	of	the	infectious	disease	cases	reported	in	the	epidemic	region	and	(2)	other	cases,	which	may	not	belong	to	the	epidemic,	and	represent	a	time-independent	background,	specific	to	the	catchment	area.		Hence,	the	incidence	of	catchment	area	i,	Ii,	may	be	written	as	a	fraction	pi	of	the	infectious	disease	incidence	in	epidemic	region	a,	Ja,	supplemented	by	a	local	background	incidence	qi;	i.e.,	Ii	=	pi	Ja	+	qi.	Thus,	time	series	from	two	catchment	areas	included	in	the	same	epidemic	region	fit	well	one	versus	the	other	through	a	linear	model,	while	time	series	from	two	catchment	areas,	not	included	in	the	same	epidemic	region,	do	not.		The	purpose	of	our	methodology	is	to	estimate	the	number	of	epidemic	regions	and	identify	the	catchment	areas	included	in	each	epidemic	region	(Fig.	1).			
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The	analyses	are	organized	according	to	the	following	steps:	(i)	Assessment	of	time-series	interdependence.	We	consider	each	pair	of	catchment	areas	and	fit	their	corresponding	time	series,	one	versus	the	other,	using	a	linear	model.		In	case	of	missing	data,	we	select	only	the	data	at	common	time	points.		The	adjusted	square	coefficient	of	determination,	R2,	used	as	goodness	of	fit,	characterizes	the	correlation	strength	between	each	pair	of	time	series.	R2	is	also	proportional	to	the	square	coefficient	of	Pearson	correlation	and	is	thus	symmetric	in	the	two	time	series,	defining	a	reflexive	relationship	of	similarity.	Hence,	the	R2	values	from	all	pairs	of	time	series	can	be	organized	as	a	symmetric	matrix.		(ii)	Determination	of	epidemic	regions.	We	consider	the	matrix	of	R2	values	as	an	adjacency	matrix,	defining	an	all-to-all	undirected	network	with	weighted	edges,	having	all	catchment	areas	as	nodes.		We	classify	the	time	series	corresponding	to	the	catchment	areas	by	determining	the	community	structure	of	this	all-to-all	network	using	modularity	maximization	(31-34).		Thus,	each	community	contains	nodes	(catchment	areas)	whose	time	series	correlate	well	to	one	another	and	forms	an	epidemic	region.	In	contrast,	the	correlation	between	time	series	of	catchment	areas	included	in	different	communities	(epidemic	regions)	may	be	significantly	weaker.	Modularity	maximization	is	employed	here	as	an	algorithm	for	unsupervised	classification	or	hierarchical	clustering	(34-36),	using	a	measure	of	similarity	(i.e.,	R2).	Many	other	classification	schemes	are	available.	However,	modularity	maximization	is	simple	to	implement	numerically	and	its	methodological	shortcomings	are	well	documented	(37).			
	 7	
We	tested	two	numerical	algorithms	(31,	33)	to	maximize	modularity	and	obtained	similar	results	for	our	ILI	data.	The	output	of	a	single	run	of	modularity	maximization	is	a	partition	of	the	nodes	into	a	number	of	disjoint	communities,	determined	by	the	algorithm.	In	fact,	each	node	is	assigned	a	numerical	label,	from	1	to	C,	for	the	community	where	it	belongs.	The	output	is	organized	as	a	vector	of	community	labels,	with	length	equal	to	the	number	of	nodes.	This	data	structure,	fundamental	for	our	analyses,	is	called	modularity	vector	(31,	33).		(iii)	Impact	of	data	uncertainty.		Epidemic	regions	result	from	classifying	a	relatively	small	numbers	of	nodes	(catchment	areas)	whose	features	are	defined	by	noisy	data.	Bootstrap	analyses	can	establish	the	robustness	of	the	node	classification	with	respect	to	noise.	Here,	we	organized	according	to	the	following	three	steps.		(iiia)	Surrogate	datasets.	We	built	surrogates	for	each	data	point	using	a	normal	distribution	with	mean	at	the	incidence	estimate	and	variance	tuned	by	the	corresponding	confidence	interval	(i.e.,	parametric	bootstrap).	We	thus	generated	10	000	surrogate	datasets,	which	we	analyzed	according	to	steps	(i)	and	(ii)	described	above.			(iiib)	Bootstrap	analyses.	The	labeling	of	the	communities	serves	no	particular	purpose	beyond	single	run	analysis.	This	leads	to	difficulties	in	the	case	where	many	modularity	vectors	are	to	be	processed	as	an	ensemble.	Even	in	the	case	where	nearly	similar	datasets	are	processed,	all	yielding	exactly	the	same	partition,	the	community	labeling	
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may	differ,	leading	to	different	modularity	vectors.		However,	in	this	case,	we	can	align	each	modularity	vector	to	the	first,	by	searching	among	all	permutations	of	symbols	from	1	to	C	for	a	relabeling	of	the	communities	that	makes	each	modularity	vector	coincide	with	the	first.				The	same	principle	works	for	the	case	where	datasets	are	not	too	similar	(still,	noise	in	the	data	should	be	sufficiently	small),	so	the	resulting	modularity	vectors	correspond	to	different,	but	similar	partitions.	In	general,	analysis	of	bootstrap	data	yields	an	ensemble	of	modularity	vectors	where	the	number	of	communities,	C,	ranges	from	1	to	some	maximum	value,	Cmax.	For	each	value	of	C,	we	chose	a	reference	vector,	which	we	align	as	follows.	Given	two	modularity	vectors	with	C1	and,	respectively	C2	communities	(C1	≤	C2),	we	search	among	all	permutations	of	symbols	from	1	to	C1	for	a	relabeling	that	maximizes	the	number	of	identical	symbols	between	the	two	vectors.	The	remaining	(i.e.,	non-reference)	modularity	vectors	may	be	then	quickly	aligned	to	the	reference	vector	with	the	corresponding	value	of	C,	using	a	similar	procedure.	Alignment	of	modularity	vectors	ensures	the	same	community	labeling	for	the	analyses	of	all	bootstrap	data.			(iiic)	Summary	statistics	for	the	ensemble	of	aligned	modularity	vectors	The	ensemble	of	aligned	modularity	vectors	is	further	processed	to	reveal	distinctions	in	the	node	classification	based	on	details	attributable	to	noise	in	the	data.	In	particular,	we	compute	fai,	the	fraction	of	times	catchment	area	i	appeared	in	community	a.	To	evaluate	the	global	impact	that	uncertainty	has	on	community	structure,	we	calculate	the	following	bootstrap	score		
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𝐵 = − 𝑓!!𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑓!!𝑁𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑁!!!!
!!"#
!!! .	If	all	values	of	fai	are	either	0	or	1,	then	data	uncertainty	has	no	impact	on	community	decomposition	and	B=0;	the	higher	the	value	of	B,	the	deeper	the	impact	of	data	uncertainty	on	community	decomposition;	see	section	1	in	the	supporting	document	(SD)	for	further	discussion.		(iv)	Data	aggregation	for	each	epidemic	region.	Incidence	time	series	belonging	to	community	a	may	be	aggregated	using	the	catchment	area	population	multiplied	by	fai,	as	weight.	This	yields	a	time	series	of	expected	incidence	and	corresponding	CI	for	each	community.	We	do	not	aggregate	a	time	series	for	community	a	if	 𝑓!!!!!! < 2;	that	is,	the	weights	for	region	a	do	not	amount	to	represent	at	least	two	catchment	areas.			(v)	Validation.	We	reject	the	analyses	if	the	resulting	bootstrap	score	B	is	above	a	pre-established	threshold.	Furthermore,	we	use	Hellinger	distance	(38)	to	validate	statistically	the	distinction	between	two	aggregated	time	series.	Namely,	for	each	moment	of	time,	we	calculate	the	Hellinger	distance	between	the	corresponding	data,	assuming	that	incidence	is	normally	distributed.	Then,	summing	the	pairwise	Hellinger	distances	over	the	duration	of	the	time	series,	we	obtain	a	Hellinger	score,	denoted	by	H.	The	distinction	between	two	epidemic	regions	is	rejected	if	the	Hellinger	score	between	the	corresponding	aggregated	time	series	is	less	than	a	certain	threshold.	In	this	case,	one	may	choose	to	merge	the	two	epidemic	regions,	as	the	distinction	revealed	by	the	algorithm	may	be	too	small	to	have	operational	value.	
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	The	interdependence	between	aggregated,	community	time	series	may	be	further	assessed	using	Pearson	correlation;	see	step	(i).		Community	decompositions	with	high	bootstrap	score	B,	where	many	values	of	fai	differ	significantly	from	0	or	1,	yield	high	R2	values	between	aggregated	time	series,	because	the	time	series	for	catchment	area	i	may	contribute	significantly	to	several	aggregated	community	time	series.	This	is	where	our	analyses	do	poorly.	In	contrast,	for	community	decompositions	with	low	bootstrap	score	B,	we	may	expect	that	R2	between	aggregated	time	series	is	small,	indicating	weak	interdependence	and	a	meaningful	disaggregation	of	the	national	epidemic	curve.	We	may	also	conclude	that	our	analyses	are	successful	if	the	bootstrap	score	B	is	low	and,	on	average,	only	one	community	is	found.	In	this	case,	we	say	that	the	entire	surveillance	area	was	subject	to	an	epidemic	homogeneous	in	space.		In	the	case	of	automated	surveillance,	where	the	lengths	of	the	time	series	increase	steadily	with	time,	the	above	analyses	may	be	repeated	for	each	additional	time	point,	to	constantly	monitor	B,	H	and	R2.		
	
RESULTS	Each	seasonal	epidemic	may	have	unique	dynamic	and	spatial	pattern.	Hence,	we	performed	our	analyses	for	yearly	datasets.		Furthermore,	we	split	yearly	data	into	two:	a	26-week	period	(the	influenza	season,	mid-October	to	mid-April)	when	influenza	epidemics	can	occur	in	France,	and	its	yearly	complement.	
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Analyses	were	carried	out	independently.	During	an	influenza	season,	the	weekly	number	of	ILI	cases	per	100	000	individuals	typically	peaks	at	high	values	(i.e.,	350-2000),	while	off-season,	it	passes	through	much	lower	values	(i.e.,	<100).	Our	analyses	showed	that	findings	are	robust	regarding	the	definition	of	the	influenza	season,	provided	that	the	time	interval	defined	by	the	start	week	(SD,	Table	S1)	and	the	26-week	duration	includes	the	high	incidence	values.			We	contrasted	analyses	of	data	collected	during	the	influenza	season	with	analyses	of	data	collected	off-season	(SD,	Fig.	S1).	The	adjusted	R2	values	were	relatively	high	for	the	data	collected	during	the	influenza	season,	motivating	the	search	for	epidemic	regions	(SD,	Fig.	S2).	In	contrast,	R2	values	were	consistently	low	for	the	data	collected	off-season,	indicating	that	ILI	incidence	time	series	are	poorly	correlated.		Thus,	the	search	for	epidemic	regions	was	not	motivated,	in	this	case.		We	performed	analyses	at	3	levels	of	spatial	resolution	(SD,	Fig.	S3).	First	we	considered	the	department	level	(NUTS3;	96	departments).	The	typical	French	department	had	~500	000	population	and	3-5	practitioners	participating	to	the	Sentinelles	surveillance	system.	Under	the	circumstances,	fluctuations	in	reported	ILI	cases	proved	important	for	time	series	dynamics	and	trends	were	not	readily	apparent.	The	resulting	R2	values	were	relatively	low	and,	searching	for	community	structure	at	this	level,	unjustified	(SD,	Fig.	S3).	Analyses	at	the	level	of	the	largest	regions	(NUTS1;	13	regions)	were	successful.	However,	the	spatial	resolution	was	rather	coarse.	A	better	approach	was	the	middle	ground	of	spatial	resolution,	provided	by	the	22	administrative	regions	(NUTS2).	
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	Bootstrap	analyses	unveiled	the	role	of	data	uncertainty	for	our	results	(SD,	Table	S1).	Based	on	retrospective	analyses,	we	divided	the	31	influenza	seasons	into	four	groups:	seasons	where	(1)	B>0.1	and	data	uncertainty	had	a	significant	impact	on	ascertaining	spatial	homogeneity/heterogeneity	of	epidemics	(5/31),	(2)	H<10	and	thus,	aggregated	time	series	were	very	similar,	considering	data	uncertainty	(5/31),	(3)	the	level	of	spatial	heterogeneity	may	be	subject	to	further	discussion	(11/31),	and	(4)	spatial	heterogeneity	was	particularly	strong,	playing	a	clear	role	for	surveillance	(10/31).	Group	(4)	is	described	in	Table	1.				Retrospective	analyses	revealed	three	scenarios	how	epidemic	heterogeneity	played	a	role	relative	to	the	current	protocols	for	epidemic	alert	and	epidemic	threshold	in	France.		Accordingly,	we	present	detailed	results	about	six	illustrative	influenza	seasons.	Figure	2	shows	results	for	the	2015-2016	and	1985-1986	influenza	seasons,	where	the	surveillance	area	of	Sentinelles	was	divided	into	two	epidemic	regions	of	comparable	size.	We	colored	a	catchment	area	depending	on	the	fraction	of	times	it	occurred	in	the	first	epidemic	region	and	the	fraction	of	times	it	occurred	in	the	second	epidemic	region,	in	bootstrap	analyses	of	10	000	datasets.	A	catchment	area	was	colored	blue	or	red	if	it	occurred	always	in	the	first	or	second	epidemic	region;	i.e.,	the	fractions	were,	respectively,	either	(1.0,	0.0)	or	(0.0,	1.0).	Otherwise,	we	used	intermediate	colors,	linearly	interpolated	in	the	RGB	palette.	However,	in	the	case	of	low	B,	all	map	colors	are	nearly	blue	or	nearly	red.				
	 13	
The	two	epidemic	regions	that	we	found	have	distinct	influenza	dynamics;	see	bottom	panels	in	Fig.	2.	The	epidemic	in	one	region	(blue)	started	early,	while	the	epidemic	in	the	other	region	(red)	started	3-4	weeks	later.	The	national	epidemic	alert	(vertical	line)	was	triggered	by	the	early	epidemic.	Hence,	for	3-4	weeks,	one	region	was	under	alert,	yet	not	experiencing	an	epidemic,	because	of	the	epidemic	in	the	other	region.	In	these	cases,	simply	mapping	the	difference	between	the	local	and	national-level	ILI	incidence	at	the	time	of	the	national	epidemic	alert,	suggested	clear	patterns	of	spatial	heterogeneity	(SD,	Fig.	S4).		Figure	3	shows	results	for	the	1997-1998	and	1991-1992	influenza	seasons.	Again,	in	each	case,	the	surveillance	area	was	divided	into	two	epidemic	regions	of	comparable	size.	The	epidemics	arrived	nearly	at	the	same	time;	the	delay	was	only	1	week,	which	is	the	time	resolution	of	Sentinelles.	However,	the	subsequent	epidemic	dynamics	were	quite	different	in	the	two	regions	that	might	have	benefited	from	tailored	surveillance.	For	example,	in	the	1997-1998	influenza	season,	ILI	incidence	peaked	5	weeks	apart	in	the	two	epidemic	regions.	This	was	not	the	case	for	the	1991-1992	influenza	season.	However,	during	the	1991-1992	influenza	season,	ILI	incidence	in	one	epidemic	region	(blue)	reached	below	the	epidemic	threshold	5	weeks	before	the	ILI	incidence	in	the	other	epidemic	region	(red).		Finally,	we	report	on	the	2014-2015	and	2012-2013	influenza	seasons	(Table	1	and	SD,	Table	S1),	where	the	whole	surveillance	area	appeared	as	a	single	epidemic	region	in	97%	and	85%	of	the	bootstrap	analyses,	respectively.	These	
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are	remarkable	cases	of	epidemic	homogeneity	in	space.	Consequently,	the	national	alerts	were	timely	for	the	entire	surveillance	area.		To	assess	their	performance	for	real-time	applications,	we	repeated	our	analyses	with	varying	amount	of	data.	Namely,	we	considered	datasets	from	the	beginning	of	the	influenza	season	up	to	a	certain	week	after	the	epidemic	alert	and	investigated	how	B	and	R2	change	with	the	amount	of	data.	Figure	4	shows	results	for	the	2015-2016	and	1997-1998	influenza	seasons,	where	the	most	likely	divide	was	into	two	epidemic	regions.	The	amount	of	data	gathered	from	the	beginning	of	the	influenza	season	up	to	the	time	of	the	national	alert,	and	immediately	after,	was	insufficient	for	clear	results.	B	values	were	high,	indicating	that	data	uncertainty	had	a	strong	impact	on	our	results.	Furthermore,	aggregated	time	series	were	highly	correlated,	resembling	the	national	epidemic	curve.	However,	data	gathered	4-5	weeks	after	the	nationwide	alert	was	already	sufficient	to	ascertain	spatial	heterogeneity	of	the	epidemic	with	B<0.1	and	
R2<0.6.	Analyses	of	datasets	for	the	following	weeks	provided	confirmation,	with	a	slightly	increasing	trend	for	R2	as	the	epidemic	went	extinct.			It	is	important	to	note	that,	even	if	detection	of	epidemic	regions	may	occur	later	than	the	nationwide	alert,	it	can	still	offer	critical	information	on	the	qualitative	and	quantitative	dynamics	of	regional	epidemics.	For	example,	in	the	case	of	the	2015-2016	influenza	season	(Fig.	4),	robust	detection	of	epidemic	regions	is	obtained	in	week	5	after	the	global	epidemic	alert.	Inspection	of	Fig.	2	reveals	that	this	corresponds	to	week	10	of	the	influenza	season.	At	that	time,	the	epidemic	was	past	its	peak	in	the	blue	epidemic	region,	but	not	in	the	red	region.	
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Incidentally,	the	epidemic	was	also	not	past	its	peak	at	the	national	scale.	Similar	results	hold	for	the	1997-1998	influenza	season.	Hence,	our	methods	can	successfully	deliver	the	spatial	structure	of	influenza	epidemics,	in	time	for	improving	monitoring	and	control	during	the	influenza	season.				
DISCUSSION	Timeliness	is	a	key	performance	measure	of	public	health	surveillance	systems	(39).	However,	timeliness	can	depend	on	the	scale	at	which	information	is	aggregated	to	inform	public	health	practitioners.	For	example,	in	France,	epidemic	alerts	for	influenza	are	given	once	for	the	whole	surveillance	area,	based	on	data	aggregated	at	the	national	level.	There	are	obvious	statistical	advantages	in	aggregating	time	series	at	the	national	level:	noise	is	much	reduced	and	incidence	trends	are	more	prominent	as	they	cross	epidemic	thresholds.	However,	in	case	of	spatial	heterogeneity,	this	approach	masks	distinct	epidemic	dynamics	taking	place	in	the	surveillance	area,	and	undermines	the	usefulness	of	the	surveillance	system.			The	case	of	influenza	illustrates	this	problem	perfectly.	The	burden	of	seasonal	influenza	epidemics	is	large	in	western	countries	(40).	Once	the	epidemic	alert	is	triggered,	national	media	campaigns	on	prevention	are	launched	in	the	press,	TV	and	radio,	with	messages	on	hygiene	and	vaccination.	Timing	can	be	critical,	since	vaccine-induced	protection	becomes	effective	about	2	weeks	after	vaccination	(41).	However,	more	concerning	is	the	impact	of	influenza	epidemics	on	the	routine	functioning	of	hospital	wards	(42).	In	France,	influenza	epidemic	
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alerts	put	hospitals	under	stress,	as	emergency	protocols	may	be	activated	(e.g.,	postponing	non-urgent	interventions,	conscripting	staff,	freeing	hospital	beds).	Untimely	decisions	in	these	situations	may	lead	to	inefficiency	and	incumbent	costs	to	society.			It	is	therefore	important	to	identify	situations	where	a	public	health	message,	designed	for	national	broadcast,	can	be	later	supplemented	with	customized	information	for	the	local	practitioners.	Mapping	incidence	data	already	gives	important	clues	about	epidemic	heterogeneity	(43).	Furthermore,	gravity/radiation	models	(44-48)	could	be	employed	for	extensive	spatiotemporal	analyses,	including	data	fitting.	However,	these	models	make	strong	assumptions	on	how	two	catchment	areas	must	interact;	i.e.,	gravity	models	assume	that	interaction	declines	with	(square)	distance,	while	radiation	models	assume	that	individuals	spread	like	radiation	fluxes.	With	the	goal	of	classifying	spatiotemporal	data,	we	made	minimal	assumptions	about	the	geographical	structure,	using	concepts	of	metapopulation	theory	to	discover	the	spatial	structure	of	epidemics.	Still,	the	epidemic	regions	that	we	found	cluster,	to	a	large	extent,	neighboring	catchment	areas.			Regions	of	distinct	epidemic	dynamics	may	occur	for	a	variety	of	reasons.	Factors	known	to	influence	the	transmission	of	influenza	are:	susceptibility	profile	of	the	population,	circulating	strains,	vaccine	parameters	and	vaccination	patterns,	travel	and	daily	commuting,	school	holidays,	and	the	weather.	In	addition,	the	spatiotemporal	coordinates	of	the	individuals	who	happen	to	initiate	the	influenza	epidemics	(so-called	patients	zero)	may	also	be	very	
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important.	Therefore,	an	account	for	the	spatial	heterogeneity	of	influenza,	starting	from	first	principles,	may	be	particularly	challenging.	Our	strategy	was	to	determine	influenza	epidemic	regions	directly,	using	surveillance	data,	by	analyzing	local	epidemic	dynamics	provided	by	incidence	time	series.			Acknowledging	spatial	heterogeneity	in	a	surveillance	area	and	identifying	epidemic	regions	may	have	important	consequences	for	improving	influenza	monitoring	and	control.		The	operational	value	of	epidemic	regions	depends	on	several	key	items.	First,	the	spatial	resolution	must	be	appropriate	(49).	Here,	the	signal	to	noise	ratio	was	too	small	for	a	meaningful	analysis	at	the	NUTS3	level,	but	sufficient	for	defining	epidemic	regions	at	NUTS2	and	NUTS1	level.	This	is	relevant	for	the	structure	of	public	health	administration	in	France.	Second,	the	time	to	identification	of	distinct	dynamics	must	be	compatible	with	staggered	delivery	of	public	health	messages.	Here,	4-5	weeks	of	data	past	the	time	of	the	epidemic	alert	were	necessary	to	identify	epidemic	regions.	Even	with	this	delay,	valuable	regional	updates	can	be	passed	to	the	local	health	authorities	during	the	epidemic,	to	maintain	vigilance	in	the	affected	territories.			The	distinction	of	epidemic	regions	may	be	also	relevant	for	collecting	pathogen	samples.	Every	influenza	season,	clinical	samples	from	ILI	cases	are	collected	and	analyzed,	to	establish	the	spectrum	of	circulating	virus	strains.	In	turn,	this	determines	the	composition	of	future	influenza	vaccines.	Clinical	samples	should	be	collected	from	each	epidemic	region	for	a	better	characterization	of	the	circulating	influenza	strains.			
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In	conclusion,	we	proposed	new	methodology	to	detect	spatial	heterogeneity	in	disease	surveillance	data	and	discussed	monitoring	ILI	in	France.	However,	our	methods	are	not	tailored	to	influenza	epidemiology	and	may	be	used	for	other	case	diseases.			
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TABLE	LEGENDS	
Table	1.	Summary	of	results	for	influenza	seasons	where	the	bootstrap	score	B	was	lower	than	0.1	and	the	adjusted	R2	between	aggregated	time	series	was	lower	than	0.6	or	one	epidemic	region	was	most	likely	to	occur.		The	most	likely	divide	was	into	two	epidemic	regions,	with	the	exception	of	the	2014-2015	and	
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2012-2013	influenza	seasons	for	which	only	one	region	was	most	likely	to	occur.		The	probability	for	the	most	likely	number	of	regions	to	occur	was	larger	than	0.85,	in	each	case.	
	
	
	
FIGURE	LEGENDS	
Figure	1.	Conceptual	representation	of	a	surveillance	system	observing	a	spatially	heterogeneous	epidemic.	The	surveillance	area	(thick	contour)	is	divided	into	N	catchment	areas	represented	as	squares	(e.g.,	i,	j,	k).	Several	(say	
C)	nearly	independent	community	epidemics	may	develop	simultaneously	in	various	regions	of	the	surveillance	area;	hence	we	may	distinguish	several	epidemic	regions	(e.g.,	a,	b).	An	epidemic	region	may	include	several	catchment	areas;	e.g.,	catchment	areas	i	and	j	are	included	in	epidemic	region	a,	while	catchment	area	k	is	included	in	epidemic	region	b.	The	incidence	time	series	of	area	i	fits	well	the	incidence	time	series	of	area	j	through	a	linear	model,	as	catchment	areas	i	and	j	belong	to	the	same	epidemic	region	and	sample	the	same	epidemic	dynamics.	In	contrast,	the	incidence	time	series	of	area	i	fits	badly	the	incidence	time	series	of	area	k,	as	catchment	areas	i	and	k	belong	to	different	epidemic	regions.	The	purpose	of	our	methodology	is	to	sort	out	the	incidence	time	series	in	all	catchment	areas	and	attribute	each	area	to	an	epidemic	region.		
Figure	2.	Analyses	for	the	2015-2016	and	1985-1986	influenza	seasons.	The	left	panels	refer	to	2015-2016,	while	the	right	panels	refer	to	1985-1986	(Corsica	was	excluded	due	to	missing	data).	The	upper	panels	represent	the	epidemic	
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regions	that	we	found	for	France.	A	NUTS2	region	(i.e.,	catchment	area)	was	colored	depending	on	the	fraction	of	times	it	occurred	in	the	first	epidemic	region	and	the	fraction	of	times	it	occurred	in	the	second	epidemic	region,	in	the	analyses	of	10	000	bootstrap	datasets.	Blue	corresponds	to	fractions	(1.0,	0,0)	to	occur	in	the	first	and	second	epidemic	regions,	respectively,	while	red	corresponds	to	the	fractions	(0.0,	1.0).	For	the	other	cases,	we	used	intermediate	colors.	The	lower	panels	represent	the	ILI	incidence	time	series	aggregated	over	the	epidemic	regions	(blue	and	red,	respectively),	the	national	ILI	incidence	time	series	(black)	and	the	epidemic	threshold	(dotted	line).		Note	that	the	nationwide	alert	(vertical	line)	was	not	timely	for	both	epidemic	regions.		
Figure	3.	Analyses	for	the	1997-1998	and	1991-1992	influenza	seasons.	The	panel	arrangement	and	color	code	are	similar	to	that	in	Fig.	2.	The	left	panels	refer	to	1997-1998	(Corsica	was	excluded	due	to	missing	data),	while	the	right	panels	refer	to	1991-1992.	The	upper	panels	represent	the	epidemic	regions	that	we	found	for	France.	A	NUTS2	region	(i.e.,	catchment	area)	was	colored	blue	(red)	if	it	occurred	all	the	time	in	the	first	(second)	epidemic	region.	Intermediate	colors	represent	NUTS2	regions	that	occurred	in	both	epidemic	regions.	The	lower	panels	represent	the	ILI	incidence	time	series	aggregated	over	the	epidemic	regions	(blue	and	red,	respectively),	the	national	ILI	incidence	time	series	(black)	and	the	epidemic	threshold	(dotted	line).		While	the	nationwide	alert	(vertical	line)	was	appropriate,	the	epidemic	regions	experienced	distinct	dynamics	and	could	have	benefited	from	customized	monitoring.	
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Figure	4.	The	bootstrap	parameter	B	and	the	adjusted	R2	between	the	aggregated	time	series	of	the	first	and	second	epidemic	regions	as	a	function	of	the	amount	of	data:	results	for	the	2015-2016	and	1997-1998	influenza	seasons.	Data	to	estimate	B	and	R2	was	considered	from	the	beginning	of	the	influenza	season	up	to	a	certain	week	after	the	epidemic	alert,	indicated	on	the	horizontal	axis.	Threshold	values	for	B	and	R2	at	0.1	and	0.6,	respectively,	are	shown	as	horizontal	dashed	lines.	We	note	a	marked	drop	in	B	and	R2	4-5	weeks	after	the	epidemic	alert.	
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TABLES			Season	 Start	week	 Bootstrap	score,	B	 Hellinger	score	H	between	aggregated	time	series	
Adjusted	
R2	between	aggregated	time	series	
Expected	fraction	of	catchment	areas	in	each	epidemic	regionc	2015-2016	 48	 0.006	 13.3	 0.49	 0.585;	0.414	2014-2015b	 46	 0.035	 -	 -	 0.976;	0.024	2012-2013b	 46	 0.074	 -	 -	 0.934;	0.066	2011-2012a	 48	 0.100	 10.2	 0.60	 0.492;	0.508	2010-2011	 44	 0.028	 13.4	 0.46	 0.572;	0.428	1997-1998a	 50	 0.014	 12.9	 0.34	 0.492;	0.508	1996-1997a	 42	 0.014	 14.4	 0.56	 0.436;	0.564	1991-1992	 42	 0.062	 12.3	 0.53	 0.618;	0.356;	0.026	1989-1990	 41	 0.000	 14.8	 0.43	 0.500;	0.500	1985-1986a	 44	 0.026	 13.4	 0.41	 0.341;	0.649;	0.010	aCorsica	was	excluded	from	the	analyses	due	to	missing	data.	bThe	most	likely	number	of	epidemic	regions	was	1.	cWe	exclude	values	lower	than	0.001.	One	administrative	region	represents	1/22≈0.045	(1/21≈0.048	when	Corsica	is	excluded).		
Table	
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